Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
In principle any economic analysis of retroactive rebates involves as a first step the identification of the switching costs created by the scheme. Whether the existence of switching costs actually results in (or legally implies) market foreclosure and whether this market foreclosure leads to (or legally implies) significant anti-competitive effects is a different question that will not be addressed in this paper.
Irrespective of the lack of consensus whether a particular retroactive rebate system can be qualified as an exclusionary abuse under article 82 ECT or not, there appears to be some agreement that the length of the reference period is an essential factor for assessing retroactive rebate systems. In particular it is often claimed that the longer the reference period and the more time of that reference period has already elapsed, the higher the switching costs and as a result also the potential foreclosure effect will be.
The present paper argues that the length of the reference period in rebate schemes is irrelevant for the economic assessment of switching costs and a potential foreclosure effect. As will be demonstrated in an informal way, the only relevant variables for assessing switching costs in retroactive rebate schemes are the threshold level at which the retroactive rebate applies and the rebate percentage. Switching costs are then an increasing function of the rebate percentage and the amount of units already bought from the dominant firm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I first discuss the existing view on the role of the time frame in retroactive rebates. I then turn to the mechanics of retroactive rebates and discuss what factors actually matter in assessing switching costs. I conclude with a brief summary of results.
The Perceived Role of the Reference Period
The growing literature on rebates is mostly concerned with a general assessment of rebate schemes with a more or less pronounced emphasis on economic effects
analysis. This literature is often directly targeted at competition policy development. Maybe it is due to the breadth of the approaches that careful attention to the details of an economic analysis is often not provided. Before discussing this literature, it is useful to consider the role the reference period in retroactive rebate schemes has played in the pertinent Court cases.
The key court cases with respect to rebates schemes and in particular the length of the reference period in rebates are Michelin I and II. It is hard to see how the assessment of a rebate schemes' switching costs has anything to do with what happens after that scheme is no longer in place. In addition, the ability to switch in-between identical schemes should not be different from the ability to switch to a rival supplier right from the start of the scheme.
In the draft version of this paper presented at the Competition Law Forum As can be seen in Figure 1 , retroactive rebates by definition result in noncontinuous and non-monotonic pricing schedules, that is, marginal price abruptly 11 Note that substantial attention is usually given to the coverage of rebate schemes as a percentage of the overall market in assessing foreclosure. From an economic point of view, there is no reason to believe that this is one of the key factors or even the only factor determining market foreclosure.
12 In general, rebates can be simple in the sense that they only specify a single threshold (common in individualized schemes), or they can be complex in that they define a host of threshold steps with different rebate percentages kicking in retroactively at respective levels. Threshold levels can be spelled out as minimum number of units of one or several goods or as a minimum sales value that needs to be reached for the rebate to be applicable. Rebates can in turn be given as price reductions or in kind rebates. Without lack of generality only single threshold schemes will be considered in the following. The analysis of complex rebates is more involved but not systematically different from the analysis presented here. In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, multi-product rebates that raise tying issues will not be addressed. Furthermore the significance of switching costs may also depend on whether goods are bought for resale or not. Demand effects are not addressed because they do not provide additional insights into the mechanics of rebate schemes. 
where p(x * ) is the effective unit price (as opposed to transaction price) that the dominant firm charges for a remaining quantity of x * up to x T . As is easily 13 The non-linearity of the pricing scheme is probably the reason rebate schemes are often treated as being similar to two-part tariffs. Such resemblance is, however, superficial. The crucial feature of rebate scheme pricing schedules is the lack of monotonicity that is not found in other non-linear pricing schemes.
14 Where x denotes the amount already bought from the dominant firm and x * the remaining quantity up to the threshold so that 
15
To consider the potential 15 Clearly, x t denotes the units already bought at time t. Consider the switching costs at t =t. If γt < 1, the rebate threshold has not been reached and switching costs can be calculated. Is it possible to draw any conclusions as to the switching costs from a knowledge oft? We know that γt −1 ≤ γt, i. e., that quantity is non-decreasing in time, so that switching costs are non-decreasing in time as well. Without knowledge of γt, switching costs at t cannot be calculated. The same holds for T . Again γt needs to be known and knowledge of T alone does not allow the calculation of switching costs. In fact T could be any positive real number ceteris paribus.
16
16 Imagine, for example, a rebate scheme for Christmas trees. Imagine further that Christmas trees are only bought in December. Given the product, the reference period of the scheme (T ) could well be specified either as the full year, or alternatively as December, without having any impact on switching costs.
Excluding boundedly rational behavior 17 on the buyers side, as, for example, time preference inconsistencies, the index t can be dropped because it does not contribute to the analysis of switching costs. 
As before, this expression can be interpreted as the price a competitor would need to offer for the remaining x * units. If µ = 1 this expression reduces to
(1). Note that by definition p(x * ) < p, so that switching costs are lower under uncertainty.
21
Since the seller offering the rebate scheme in a situation of uncertainty may be able to adjust to this, it does not follow that the identification of demand uncertainty is sufficient to conclude that switching costs will tend to 17 An experimental study of rebate schemes would certainly be relevant in order to establish if there exist stable and significant "irrational" effects not caught by traditional theorizing. In addition, the prescriptive expected utility approach chosen here could be replaced by a descriptive prospect theoretic approach. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979) Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, Econometrica, 47. 263-292. 18 Technically t matters in the sense that the present value of the rebate varies with t. With T → ∞, the present value of x T αp → 0. 20 Note that there exists anx < x T that will leave the buyer indifferent between buyingx or x T units. Note also that µ does not contain 1 or 0. If µ = 1 or µ = 0, there is no uncertainty, either the threshold will be reached or it will not be reached with certainty.
21 Under certainty, switching costs are given by p(x * ). If p(x * ) < µp(x * ) + (1 − µ)p holds, switching costs are lower under uncertainty ceteris paribus because the expected average price on the remaining units is higher (Note that switching costs decrease in price). Simplifying we
Since α = 0 by definition, it follows that p(x * ) < p and therefore switching costs are lower under uncertainty. Dropping the ceteris paribus, a rational seller will clearly anticipate this and adjust the threshold and/or the rebate percentage accordingly.
be lower than without uncertainty.
22
Disregarding the possibility of asymmetric information, the uncertainty at t = 0 is also known by the seller. As a result, irrespective of whether the ex ante probability of reaching x T is a function of T , the seller will consider this when setting up the rebate scheme. A demand shock can therefore only affect switching costs if it occurs at t = 0, that is, within the reference period.
23
This is due to the fact that the seller can no longer adjust the rebate scheme accordingly.
24
Even if expected demand is modelled as a stochastic process and therefore depends on remaining time, the reference period T does as such not contribute to the calculation of switching costs.
Conclusion
As is clear from the previous section, retroactive rebates result in discontinuous and non-monotonic pricing schedules. As a result, marginal prices are nonincreasing in quantity up to and including the threshold (p, p(x and may cause a competition concern if switching costs result in market foreclosure. The pre- 22 The same logic applies of course to endogenous demand. For instance, if total demand in T is below x T , x T could still be reached if the good can be stocked. Such a situation will, however, in most cases require the assumption of non-profit maximizing behavior on the seller side because there would be no reason not to adjust T in such a way that demand equals x T (or to adjust x T to the demand in T ). Even though this equilibrium argument is not further explored here, the assumption that x T is set to equal demand is incentive compatible and therefore very robust. 23 The assumption made here is of course that only simply contracts can be written, that is, contracts that specify a real valued threshold, not a conditional one. If contracts can be written that are capable of adjusting the threshold contingent on events within the reference period, switching costs will be affected (since the threshold quantity will change) but not necessarily decreased.
24 Under asymmetric information (expected) demand ex ante may already be unknown to the seller. The problem is then one of information asymmetry and not of uncertainty or time.
25 Note that in the case of non-monotonic pricing schedules allocative efficiency is never fulfilled.
vailing view, probably unduly extrapolated from the exclusive dealing literature, that the reference period should be part of an economic analysis of switching costs cannot be endorsed. Of course elapsed time will often be correlated with quantity, so that the suction effect may be the most pronounced towards the end of the period. However, such a correlation is only due to the fact that total quantity is non-decreasing in time.
Even if the reference period is not relevant for the assessment of switching costs, it is of course an essential part of any rebate system. If foreclosure is sought through a retroactive rebate system, the threshold x T to be met within a certain time period T needs to be properly set, and that necessarily implies assessing expected demand within a particular time frame. Knowledge of the threshold level, the retroactive rebate rate and the amount already bought is a necessary but also sufficient condition for assessing switching costs in retroactive rebates. As a result, and to come back to the initial question addressed in this paper, the length of the reference period does not allow any conclusions with respect to switching costs.
As a result, the length of the reference period cannot be considered as a suitable indicator for sound competition policy because the quantities associated with a certain reference period will vary across industries. In addition, the length of the reference period is not a good approximation in any particular case either, because quantities may not be linearly and proportionally increasing in time. Last but not least, it is not clear why one should not directly revert to the causally relevant indicator, that allows comparisons across industries, namely quantity.
In fact, as this paper has argued, even rebate schemes with identical reference period may lead to completely different switching costs. Competition policy would, therefore, be ill-advised to consider the length of the reference period as an essential factor in assessing retroactive rebate schemes.
